译文/Translated：
本文的目的是规划一个检查和委派个人的过程，从而让这些个人控制EOS代币创造的分配并由此决定EOS的未来方向。资金源的控制能够刺激社区朝着某个特定愿景行动。
设计这个治理提议的背后是我做的大量的背景调查和深度思考。要了解背后的哲理，请阅读这本免费的电子书《更平等的动物：真正的民主中的微妙艺术》（More Equal Animals – The subtle art of true democracy），这本书中，我探讨了组织人们在丛林法则下合作的原则。
任何社区中，最困难的一个挑战是识别哪些是局内人，哪些是局外人。局内人总支持治理过程的结果，要么就离开社区。当人们能够服从集体决定，而不选择离开的时候，社区就最强大。但是，当人们决策中永远有分歧、憎恶、苦恨的时候，社区最是脆弱。
加密货币世界中，“社区成员”的概念往往很模糊，也是“自证”的。所以，任何人都可以说自己是社区的一份子，但是其行为却不符合其他社区成员想看到的行为准则。于是一些网络喷子和敌对团体就借机抹黑我们的社区。
真正的民主是建立在“邀请”的基础上的，新成员必须被集体接受，也必须自愿成为集体的一份子。如果没有这个过程，集体就失去了认同感，也就不能团结行事，不能为了集体愿景维护品控和品格。
成为社区成员的最“基本”的要求是要风险共担：要持有代币。如果你不能证明你持有代币，那很明显你就不是社区成员。这是适用于所有加密货币社区的近似标准。很遗憾，这就导致任何有钱的人都可以加入。想想如果任何人只要花一美元就可以买到你们国家的护照！不控制移民，那么人数多的国家只要派遣一大群喷子购买护照，它们就可以攻占人少的国家的文化了。
所以持有代币还不够。实际上，我们甚至可以说持有代币是没意义的。再想想每个持有一美元的人都自动成为“社区成员”，即美国的公民？很明显，作为一个社区，美国能因为世界其他社区（不属于美国社区）使用自己的货币而受益。因此我想说，拥有代币是衡量一个人是否是社区成员的必要条件，但这还不够。
社区成员更好的定义是愿意接受社区治理过程并以此为豪的人。社区的目标是加强和保护其成员的独立性和对世界的影响。自我分裂的社区无法持久。这不是说社区里的每个人必须同意一切决定，这是不可能的。我的意思是，他们必须支持治理的过程，并且认同治理的结果。
所有社区的起源都是有一个人设立了一个愿景，而后邀请其他人加入。或者，社区也可能是由一小群无条件支持某治理过程的人发起，而后他们再邀请其他人进入。“开放社区”让人们不需要邀请就可以加入，但这效果就不好。这种社区的构成就和现有的财富持有者的文化相似了。此外，社区成员的状态还应该依据他们是否能够遵循治理过程调整。邀请也可以被撤回。这来自人们从固有同意转向自愿同意的权力。
成为成员
想要成为社区成员，你必须要求（或者收到）现有成员邀请，并获得其他两位成员的确认。这就意味着，想让一个新成员加入社区至少需要三个成员的同意。最后，这个新成员还必须被至少以为选举出来的社区官员批准才能正式加入。
你只有在成功参加自己的第一个选举之后才能要求新成员或为他们背书。原因是新成员会被随机分配给社区的九位其他成员见面，这样就能减少勾结和多账户的可能性。
每当社区扩大10%的时候就自动触发选举，在选举过程结束之前，没有新成员可以正式加入社区。这样就减少了出现大量虚假用户的女巫攻击的风险。
此外，每个新成员必须为他们参加了每个选举支付10EOS的费用。经济支持和背书二者结合最终能保证品控、风险共担、可追责、和抗女巫攻击的能力。
每场选举每个社区成员将能够邀请或背书最多20个人。这就是说，一个三人的小团体就算恶意串通每次选举最多也就能邀请20个人。
选举每年至少举行一次。
开除成员
一个社区成员时不时可能不遵守社区准则、且不愿做必要的改正。最明显的例子就是未能完成“证明身份”的挑战。如果任何现有成员怀疑另一个成员的账户是“假的”或“复制的”，这时候他们就要发起“证明身份”挑战。
开除过程首先应该由一个成员提交“开除申请”和100EOS的保证金开始。如果随机抽取的5位当选官员中的3位支持开除决议，那么保证金就被返还。否则，保证金就充公。
如果一个人被开除出社区，他们就没办法再参与治理过程了，但是他们不一定会失去自己的区块链账户及任何没有明确依靠社区成员身份存在的资产。
权威继承
每次选举都由把成员随机分配成十人小组开始。每个十人小组要达成8/10的共识，派出小组代表。这就代表了一级选举官。所有一级选举官又要被随机分配成十人小组，同样要达成8/10的共识选出小组代表，这就是二级代表。如果未能达成共识，那么该小组就没有选举官。整个流程会不断重复，直到最后的选举官总数低于十个为止。
最后这组代表（人数少于10）的构成如下：一个获得2/3+1支持的代表（主席）、两个首席代表团随机选出的代表（联合副主席）。这三个人合起来就构成了治理权威的基础（三头联盟）。
三头联盟的任何决策都必须获得主席和至少一个副主席的批准。
资金分配
鉴于社区预算每年1000万美元（即大约EOS通胀的0.25%），这是资金的流向：
50%的社区资金将由三头联盟分配，分配中必须要有2/3的共识。50%的社区资金将会作为“预算”平均分配给下一级的代表团。
所有获得预算的团体：
预算的50%由团体选举出的代表和任何团体中的其他成员控制。
50%的预算根据下表分配。
在一级代表获得该团体完全的控制之前，这个过程就会持续下去。
这个过程的结果是10，000人的社区会选出1000个代表，每个代表会获得对12,500美元的完全控制。二级代有100个，只要他们能够获得团体中一个成员的批准，他就可以获得250,000美元的直接控制。最后，主席如果能获得其他两位随机算则的副主席的认可，他就能控制500万美元的开支。
如果社区成员增长到100,000个，而总预算不变，那么分配如下表：
有趣的是，有100,000个成员的社区，每个人每次选举交10EOS，这就会自动产生400万美元的预算，而不需要做通胀。而随着社区的增长，EOS的价值也会随之增加，而预算规模也会自动扩大。
原文/Original：
The purpose of this document is to outline a process for vetting and appointing individuals to control the allocation of EOS token creation, and therefore, the future direction of EOS. Control over financial resources is the ability to incentives the action of the community toward a particular vision.
There is a lot of background research and deep thinking that goes into the design of this governance proposal. To understand the philosophy please read the free book, “More Equal Animals – The subtle art of true democracy” 46 where I expose the principles behind organizing people to work together under the law of the jungle.
One of the most difficult challenges for any community is identifying who is in the community and who is out of the community. Those who are in the community are committed to support the outcome of the governance process or to resign from the community. Communities are most powerful when people can yield to the group decisions without choosing to leave. Communities are most weak when they cannot make group decisions without creating division, resentment, and bitter culture.
In the crypto-currency world the definition of “community member” is often fuzzy and “self attested”. As a result, anyone can claim to be a member of the community and act in ways that are inconsistent with the desired code of conduct of other community members. This enables trolls and adversarial groups to paint the community in a bad light.
A true democracy is created on the basis of “invitation” where new members must be accepted by the group and must in turn voluntarily agree to be part of the group. Without this process a group can lose its identity and is unable to act in unity or maintain quality control and integrity to the group vision.
The most “basic” requirement to be a community member is to have skin in the game: to hold tokens. If you cannot demonstrate that you hold tokens then clearly you are not a community member. This is the approximate standard applied to all crypto currency communities. Unfortunately, this allows anyone with cash to join. Imagine if your country allowed anyone to buy a passport for one dollar. Uncontrolled immigration would allow a populous country to overtake the culture of a less populous country by simply sending an army of trolls to buy their way in.
It is not enough to hold a token. In fact, one could argue that holding a token is meaningless. Imagine if everyone that held a US dollar was automatically a “community member” aka “citizen” of the United States? Clearly the United States as a community benefits from the rest of the world (not part of the community) using their currency. Therefore, I would like to assert that token ownership is a necessary but not sufficient measure of community membership.
A better definition of a community member is a person who voluntarily submits to and honors the community governance process. The purpose of the community is to strengthen and protect its members independence and influence in the world. A community divided against itself cannot stand. This is not to say that everyone in a community must agree on everything, that is impossible. It is to say that they must agree on the process of governance and then honor the result.
All communities start with a single person establishing a vision and inviting others to join. Alternatively it could start with a small group of people who unanimously agree on a governance process and then that group starts inviting people to join. It is not effective to have an “open community” that allows people to join without invitation. Such a community would have a composition approximating the culture of existing wealth holders. Furthermore, your status of community member is contingent upon maintaining good standing with respect to the governance process. Invitations can be retracted. This is derived from he right to secede inherent to voluntary consent.
Becoming a Member
To become a member you must request (or be offered) an invitation from an existing member and have it confirmed by two other members. This means it takes 3 people to agree to accept a new member into the community. Finally the new member must be approved by at least one elected official of the community.
You can only invite or endorse new members after successfully participating in your first election. The reason for this is that the new member will be randomly assigned to meet with 9 other members of the community which will minimize opportunity for collusion and multiple accounts.
Every time the community grows by 10% an election is triggered automatically and no new members can officially join until the election process is concluded. This mitigates the risk of sybil attacking the election by creating a large number of fake users relative to real users.
Furthermore, each new member must make a contribution of 10 EOS to the community fund per election they participate in. The combination of financial contribution and endorsement ensures quality control, skin in the game, accountability, and sybil attack resistance.
Each member will be allowed to invite or endorse up to 20 people per election. This means that a group of 3 people can collude to invite at most 20 people per election.
Elections will be held at least once per year.
Evicting a Member
From time to time a community member may be found to be out of compliance with community standards and unwilling to make necessary corrections. The most obvious example could be the failure to complete a “proof of person” challenge. A “proof of person” challenge can be initiated by any existing member if they suspect another member account is either “fake” or “duplicate”.
The eviction process starts with an individual submitting a “evection request” along with a bond of 100 EOS. If 3 of 5 randomly selected elected officials approve the eviction then the bond is returned, otherwise the bond is forfeit.
When an individual is evicted from the community they lose their power to participate in the governance process, but they do not necessarily lose their blockchain account or any assets not explicitly contingent upon being a community member.
Authority Hierarchy
Every election starts by randomly assigning members to groups of 10. Each group of 10 must reach an 8 of 10 agreement on who represents their group. This would represent a Level 1 elected official. All Level 1 officials are then randomly assigned to groups of 10 which must reach 8 of 10 agreement on someone to represent the group, this represents a Level 2 member. If 8 of 10 agreement is not achieved then no official is elected from that group. This process is repeated until there are less than 10.
The final group of representatives (of size less than 10) will consist of 1 person with 2/3+1 approval (the president) and 2 people randomly selected from the top group (co-vice presidents). This will create 3 people who collectively form the root of the governance authority (a triumvirate).
Any action taken by the Triumvirate must be approved the president and at least one of the vice presidents.
Allocating Funds
Given a community budget of $10 million dollars per year (or about 0.25% of EOS inflation) this is how authority of the funds would be distributed:
50% of the community funds are allocated by 2/3 agreement of the triumvirate.
50% of the community funds are evenly divided as “budget” among the next lower level groups.
For each group that is awarded a budget:
50% of the budget is controlled by the elected representative of the group in combination with any other member of their group.
50% of the budget is divided among the groups below.
This process is repeated until there Level 1 representative gets full control of the budget for his group.
The outcome of this process is that a community with 10,000 people would elect 1000 representatives each of which will receive full autonomy over $12,500. There would be 100 Level 2 representatives which have control over $250,000 assuming they can get approval of one other member of their group. Lastly the president would control spending of $5 million dollars assuming he could get agreement from one of 2 randomly selected vice presidents.
If the community grew to 100,000 members with the same total budget, then the allocation would look something like this:
Interestingly enough, a community with 100,000 members each contributing 10 EOS per election would generate $4 million dollars worth of budget automatically without the need for any inflation. As the community grows and the value of EOS grows with it then the budget would scale automatically.
原文链接/Original URL:
