译文/Translated：
区块链治理的目的是尽可能地做出符合更多人利益的决定，同时减少少部分个人为私利损害社区的可能性。其关键是要符合各方利益，同时，不能完全实现区块链潜力对谁最有害，我们就要联合谁的力量。真正的权益共识必然符合长远利益并让长期参与的一方掌握控制权。
从可以被客观证明的角度来看，我们保守地假设，所有为一个节点投票的账户都属于这个节点。我们还可以把投票和“赌选”当作为了挤进前N而“租用的权益”。因为在去信任化回购协议中，租赁和出售其实没有太大的差异，所以这样的行为并不存在缺德的问题，反而是想阻止这样的行为却实际上违反了所有权。
为了保证长远收益和“风险共享”，只有锁定在长期权益合约中的代币才应该有资格投票。某人的权益收入补偿了流量损失，且这些权益所得和代币锁定时间应成正比。代币网络如果能依据市场决定利率尽久地锁定代币的时间，这就最好了。
因此，我建议建立六个权益库：以3个月、6个月、12个月、2年、5年和10年为不同期限。网络中如果有10亿代币供应，每个权益库每年以分钟为基础，获得500万代币（假定网络100%可靠）。用户可以购买库中的权益，获得库收入相应比例的份额。用户的投票权重基于他们在每个库中的权益比例。这就意味着不同的权益库中，每年有3%的通胀率。
每周最多只能从库中提取一笔资金。3月期库中的权益可以以每周收益7%（的费用）提取，十年期库中的权益（提取费用）则是每周0.2%。
权益库中的代币因为被拿出“资源”库，因此就不能被租赁给REX，于是，REX中所有代币中，每个代币的带宽就相应增加了。权益库就可以被当作一种债券：现在把代币从流通中取出，未来的某个时间再回到流通中，并从通货膨胀中获得额外的利息。
只要你的代币还在权益库中，他们的利息复利就会根据每个库的权益总量按比例增加。
短期权益库中的代币可以无延时地转移到长期库中。所以任何时候你都可以把3月期100%的权益权益到10年期去；但是，如果你不支付每周0.2%的费用，你就不能把十年期的权益转移到短期库中。
这样的权益系统最终会带来的结果是：市场力量将会基于权力欲与流量的平衡调整收益曲线。没有多少人愿意放弃十年的流量获得更高的相对收益和网络上更多权力。更多人只会希望放弃3个月的流量，他们的收益低一些、权力也少一点。
一旦每个人都有权益、进行了投票，我们就会以“一币一票”（加权质押在库中代币比例）的基础选出21个超级节点。这些节点会凭借他们获得的投票，而不是区块，获得相应比例的收益。超级节点的收益如果不能和它们的投票成线性关系，这就会提高女巫攻击的可能，最终就会导致权力中心化的风险，而不是像现在这样由21个独立方，到时候，可能就会有人想控制两个甚至更多时隙，最后可能只剩下20个，甚至更少的，超级节点。
节点收益应该减少到仅占每年供应的代币的0.5%（按全球可靠性缩减），最终，最大的权益持有方就能控制节点是谁；因此，支付给权益库的收益可能就流向了运行节点的那些人身上。
如果网络不能保证区块生产是可靠的，世界上所有的去中心化尝试就帮不了任何人；所以说，所有的通胀增率的计算方法都是7日平均获得量的1/10次方。可靠性只有99%的时候，总通货膨胀是最高通胀率3.5%的90%。如果某个节点开始丢失区块，可靠性降到97%，那么每个人的收益都降到了最大收益的73%。这就意味着投票人（权益人）因为他们没有投票给可靠的节点受到了惩罚。
预期结果
交易所不能用用户代币进行投票，因为大多数控制权绑定在长期权益合约中。一币一票的模式和收益-投票间的正比例关系这两者就会结束一个人控制了两个节点的情况。如果只有权益代币进行投票，我们相信，每个希望成为结点的人都共享风险，哪怕最低的节点时隙也是可靠的。而最好的结果可能是我们能够发现一个真正基于市场的利率和收益曲线。小权益人可以通过参与长期权益库获得额外的影响和更高的收益。
REX能够定义最短期（3天）权益库的收益，REX中的代币不再有投票权。想要获得收益的人应该转移到权益库中。
本建议的所有内容仅供社区考虑，它可能也只是很多解决方法中的一个而已。
免责声明：本文仅代表个人观点，不代表我雇主或公司任何人的观点。本文提到的所有信息请勿预设一定会被任何区块链使用或应用。任何考虑使用相应解决方案的个人应先咨询相应专家了解相关法律、法规和税收问题。
原文/Original：
The purpose of blockchain governance is to make decisions in the best interest of as many people as possible while minimizing the opportunity for a small group of people to act in ways that benefit themselves at the expense of the community. The key is to align interests and select the parties with the most to lose if the network fails to operate to its potential. True proof of stake aligns long term interests and puts control in the hands of those with a long term commitment.
From the perspective of what can be proven objectively, we can conservatively assume all accounts which vote for a producer are owned by the producer. We can also view votes and “vote buying” as nothing short of “renting stake” for the purpose of qualifying for the top N. Since there is little difference between renting and selling with a trustless repurchase agreement, there is nothing immoral with this activity and attempts to prevent it are in fact a potential violation of ownership rights.
To ensure a long-term outlook and “skin in the game”, only tokens locked in a long-term staking contract qualify for voting. The yield someone earns for staking compensates them for the loss of liquidity and should be proportional to the length of time the tokens are locked up. It is best for the network for tokens to be locked as long as possible based upon market determined rates of interest.
Therefore, I propose the creation of 6 staking pools: 3 month, 6 month, 12 month, 2 year, 5 year, and 10 year. In a network with a token supply of 1B, each pool will receive 5M tokens per year on a minute by minute basis (assuming network is operating at 100% reliability). Users can buy into the pool to receive their pro-rata share of that pools income. A user’s vote-weight is based upon the sum of their percentage ownership of each pool. This represents a 3% annual inflation paid to the different staking pools.
Funds can be withdrawn from the pool at most one a week. Stake in a 3 month pool could be withdrawn at about 7% per week. Stake in a 10 year pool could be withdrawn at 0.2% per week.
Tokens in a stake pool are taken out of the “resource” pool so cannot be lent to the REX, this increases the bandwidth per token for all tokens in the REX. The staking pools can be viewed as a bond where the tokens are taken out of circulation now and returned to circulation with added interest from inflation at some point in the future.
So long as your tokens remain in a staking pool they will have their interest compound at a rate proportional to the total amount of stake in each pool.
Tokens can move from a shorter term to a longer term without any delay. So you can move 100% of your 3 month stake to a 10 year stake at any time; however, you cannot move from a 10 year to a shorter term except at the rate of 0.2% per week.
The outcome of this staking system is that market forces will set the yield curve based upon balancing the desire for power and liquidity. Few people will want to give up liquidity for 10 years so they will earn a higher relative yield and more power over the network. More people will be willing to give up liquidity for 3 months, so they will get a lower yield and less power.
Once everyone has staked and voted, 21 block producers will be selected on a “one token one vote” basis (weighted by percent of pool tokens are staked in). These producers will be paid proportionally to the votes they receive instead of on a per-block basis. Paying block producers anything other than a linear relationship to their votes will incentives a sybil attack and result in increased centralization of power instead of 21 distinct parties, there may only be 20 or less with one person attempting to control two or more slots.
Producer rewards should be minimized to just 0.5% of token supply per year (discounted by global reliability). Ultimately, the largest stakeholders will likely control who the producers are; therefore, the yield paid to the staking pools is likely flowing to most of the same people who are running the producers.
All the decentralization in the world helps no one if the network cannot ensure that blocks are produced reliably; therefore, all inflation is scaled by the 7 day average availability raised to the 10th power. At 99% reliability the total inflation will be 90% of the max inflation of 3.5%. If a producer starts missing blocks and reliability falls to 97% then everyone’s yield falls to 73% of maximum yield. This means that voters (stakers) are punished if they don’t vote for reliable producers.
Expected Outcome
Exchanges would be unable to vote with user tokens because most of the control is tied up in long-term staking contracts. With one token one vote model and pay proportional to votes it would end the situation of two producers are operated by one individual. With only staked tokens voting we assure that everyone seeking to be a producer has skin in the game and that even the lowest producer slot is likely to be reliable. Perhaps one of the more fascinating outcomes is the discovery of a true market-based interest rate and yield curve. Smaller stakeholders can gain extra influence and higher yields by participating in the long-term staking pools.
The REX will define the yield on the shortest term (3-day) staking pool and tokens in the REX would no longer having voting rights. Those seeking yield should move to the staking pools instead.
Everything in this proposal is for community consideration and may be one of many viable solutions.
Disclaimer: Everything in this post is my opinion and not that of my employer. Do not assume anything in this post will be implemented or adopted by any blockchain. I have not considered any legal or tax consequences of the proposed design, so please consult relevant advisors before moving forward.
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