译文/Translated：
在全球范围分配独一无二的名称 ，同时还要提供无缝的用户体验，这是史诗级的挑战。气人的是，你想要的名称刚好被别人抢注了，但对方还不用这个名称。一样气人的是，有些人一下子廉价买了几千个名称，然后坐地起价。更讨厌的是，有的名字你明明已经用了几十年了，好不容易让这个名字有价值了，这时候有人抢了这个名字，然后高价要卖给你。
分配名称主要有两种方式：通过经济手段或通过政治手段。用经济手段分配的时候，人们会抱怨，“好”名字都被注册了，买一个名字太贵了。但如果用政治手段，你就要有一个共识过程，不过这个过程可能最终会导致社区冲突。想靠政治方法进行分配既不便宜也不容易。
所以我们到底要怎么获得名称？要么你就要向全世界宣布你想要的名字，要么你就让大家决定怎么叫你。但是如果两个人想要同一个名字这就会带来冲突。而且，如果 “每个人都知道”合适的名字是什么，但客观地证明“每个人都知道”什么却不容易，这种情况也会有冲突。
不管你在做什么，在你确定名字和社交媒体账号之前，一开始你都得把名字的想法“保密”。如果有人猜到你构思的东西，他们可能就会抢在你前面，尽量在各种平台上抢注名字，不让你用。唯一的解决方法就是，在你告诉别人之前，你就要把能想到的任何名字都预先注册了。只不过，好名字被“抢”了却没用这个问题，只会因此愈演愈烈。
名称分配系统应该关注尽量提供更多的名称，同时还要减少他人抢注或抢跑的可能。
所有的名称一开始都是“公共用地”，名称抢注就是公用地的一个悲剧。短名字是稀缺地产，因为好的短名称远少于想用的人和企业。一个人抢注了一个名称之后，他同时就剥夺了别人使用该名称的权力。理想状态下，不能利用该名称的每个人都应该获得补偿。名称抢注就是在窃取公用地，因为抢注者廉价购买了名字，然后还要用市价高价卖出去。
名称抢注的解决方案是分配所有的名称时，我们应该尽量把它的价值设置成市场价。这样，抢注者就不会获得利润，也能保证每个人都能通过补偿社区，拥有平等的机会获得名字。然而，一些人就希望遵循“先到先得”原则，廉价获得名字。
理论上来说，依靠拍卖了解名字的实际价格也是可行的；然而，这么做的前提是所有未来的卖家都能知道这个拍卖、也能参加拍卖。如果你想一次拍卖所有可能的名字，那对于名称抢注者来说，绝大多数名字几乎就是免费的。这是因为该名称未来的买家这时候可能还不在市场上。
要防止域名抢注，名字分配的速度应该要尽量匹配合理购买（非抢注）名字的“自然”速度。分配速度超过实际需求就会压低价格，让抢注者投机。但是慢于实际需求，价格就会虚高、不利于增长。
然而，没人知道名字分配的“自然”速度是多少，而且它也不是恒定的。可能一周内会突然有一大群新用户，但接下来一个月一个都没有。在上升期，对名字分配做静态限制会抑制应用，但在发展缓慢期则让抢注者有利可图。
EOS高质量名称算法
EOS网络通过竞拍高质量名称防止名称抢注。名字越短稀缺性越强。短名字可以用来创造命名空间，如“.com”，企业可以 购买短名称，分配所有词尾相同的名称。这样Anchor钱包就可以出售高质量的“.gm”名称，其用户不需要再参与竞拍了。
这个算法的运作方式是：一天最多只有一个高质量名称会被出售、它必须是待定的名称中最昂贵的、且它必须在24小时内保持热度。如果碰到竞买，那么高质量名称分配的速度可能会降下来，或许要一周以上。
很多人不喜欢这个算法，因为这样要花费的时间不好说，而且也非常昂贵。理论上，获得你想要的名称只需要24小时…如果你愿意比别人多支付很多，你确实可以插队。
但这个方法的一个好处是，如果有人想赶超你，你还有24小时叫价竞买，保证你能获得目标名称。
动态定价算法
另一个方法是模仿比特币的工作证明算法。比特币的目标是平均每分钟生产一个区块。有时候，每小时可能产生30个区块，但有时候可能一个都没有。如果区块生产过快，比特币就会增加难度，但如果不够快，比特币会降低难度。这个难度就是获得下个区块采矿权的价格。
同样的算法可以被用来限制分配名称的速度，这样我们就不用举行拍卖了。每出现N个名字或每H小时，我们就可以调整一次名称的价格。如果速度高于目标，价格就可以提高；如果低于目标，价格可以降低。
这个算法的好处是如果你想要一个名字，你就知道现在的价格，就可以马上获得这个名字！此外，在任何一个时间，在售的所有名字的价格都一样。然而，你还是得抢跑。这个方法很好地处理短时间需求上涨的问题，同时也减少了抢注方垄断的可能。
混合模式
你可以利用动态定价算法设置24小时后会结束的拍卖的起拍价。24小时内你可以获得任何想要的名称，也没有谁可以抢跑。
政治方法
要利用政治方法，你首先要识别哪些“民众群体”有权从公共命名领域中批准一个名称只能由某人使用。Eden on EOS社区可以“获得”处理分配争议的权力。识别对应的社区之后，你就必须识别一个流程。该流程可能是：
- 任何人都可以要求获得任何一个名称，并向社区报价
- 收集投票，如果“赞成”票高于“反对”票，那么就可以获得名字的使用权。
这个流程和拍卖一样，需要时间。而且它也可能最终变成党派问题，你可能得贿赂它们才能获得投票。还有可能会导致选民的厌恶，因为大多数人并不在意。为了实现公平和可持续，你得给参与审核和批准名称分配的选民补偿。但因为这个流程需要的时间长、劳动力多，所以，名称的使用权可能比纯市场流程中的更昂贵。
或许抢注也不是那么糟糕
但或许，如果抢注者买完名称之后能把不用的名称放在市场上销售，社区或许也能获得好处。名字依然可以购买，而抢注者也要承担卖不出去的风险。社区可能不能因为一个名字获得最大的利润，但是，它可以低价出售更多名称，这样也能实现利润最大化。
EOS名称&缩写提议
名称或缩写可以被“保留”但不能被“消耗”。这就是说，我可以额保留创建账号“dantheman”的权力，而不一定要真的创建这个账号。创建账号很昂贵，一旦创建了就不能删除。此外，创建账号之后如果要转移账号也很麻烦。代币缩写也面临着相似的问题，因为缩写一旦完全确定，诸如计数精度等属性就无法改变。
但是“创建权限”转移和NFT转移一样简单。“保留”账号或缩写名比“消耗的”账号或缩写名更有价值，对我们来说，这就是一个机遇。
我建议我们使用混合模式保留名称；但是，一旦一个名称被保留，所有人可以要选择要把它放在市场上还是要直接转换成账号。如果放在市场上，那么每个人都可以“马上购买”，那么这些“抢注者”就获得利润。
利用这个方法，你依然可以对名称分配“限制速度”，但是你必须要特别注意避免出现供过于求、或者让抢注者过分获利的情况，这样才能真正起作用。
政策补贴
很多人还在抱怨，对于一些比较“捉襟见肘的”项目，这个流程还是导致名称和缩写太昂贵了。但还有很多方法可以游说社区，获得资金支持，让社区承担名称和缩写的费用。利用市场力量确定价值之后，政治方法就能更好地理解给这些“捉襟见肘的”项目一个稀缺名称背后的机会成本。如果政治过程可以安排资金购买名称，那么就没必要专门设立一个复杂的政治方法分配名称。
原文/Original：
Allocating globally unique names while providing a seamless user experience is an epic challenge. People hate it when the name they want has been taken by someone who isn’t using it. They equally hate it when someone buys thousands of names cheaply and then attempts to sell them at a premium price. What is even worse is when someone takes the name you have been using for decades, a name you made valuable, and then tries to sell it to you at a premium price.
There are two primary ways to ration names: economically or politically. When you ration names economically the complaint is all the “good” names are taken and are extremely expensive. When you ration names politically you need a consensus process which becomes a potential point of community conflict. Navigating a political process is not cheap nor easy.
How do we get our names anyway? You either declare to the world what you want to be called or the world chooses what to call you. This creates a point of conflict when two people both want to be called the same thing. There is also a conflict when “everyone knows” the proper name but proving what “everyone knows” in an objective manner is challenging.
Early on in any business you have to keep your ideas for names a “secret” until you have secured your domain names and social media handles. If anyone gets wind of names you are merely considering then they might claim that name before you on as many platforms as possible and then extort you to use it. The only defense is to preemptively register any name you think you might use before you share your thoughts with anyone. This only compounds the problem of good names being “taken” but unused and unavailable.
A name allocation system should aim to make the maximum number of names available as possible while mitigating the risk that someone will engage in squatting or front running.
All names start out in the “public commons” and name-squatting is an example of the tragedy of the commons. Short names are scarce real estate because there are far fewer quality short names than there are people and businesses that would like to use them. When someone claims a name they are simultaneously denying it to everyone else. Ideally, everyone who loses the opportunity to use the name should be compensated by the person who gets to claim the name. Name-squatting is effectively theft from the public commons because the squatter buys the name cheap and then attempts to resell the name at fair market prices.
The solution to name-squatting is to allocate all names at a price as close to fair market value as possible. This removes the profit margin of the squatter and ensures that everyone has an equal opportunity to claim a name by reimbursing the broader community. Unfortunately, this is not popular among people who want names to be allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis for a cheap price.
In theory, using an auction to discover the price of a name works; however, this assumes that all future potential buyers are aware of the auction and ready to participate. If you attempted to auction every possible name at the same time, then the vast majority would sell for a fraction of a cent to a name squatter. This is because the future real user for the name is not in the market at the time of the auction.
In order to prevent name squatting, the rate at which names are allocated needs to match as closely as possible the “natural” rate of claiming names for legitimate (non-squatting) purposes. Allocating names faster than real demand will suppress the price and create opportunities for squatters. Allocating names slower than real demand will push prices higher than necessary and hinder growth.
Unfortunately, no one knows what the “natural” rate of name allocation is and it is something that is not constant. You can have a surge of new users one week, then nothing for a month. Static rate-limiting of name allocation can frustrate adoption during the surge and still enable squatting opportunities during slow periods.
EOS Premium Name Algorithm
The EOS network attempted to prevent name squatting by auctioning preimum names. The shorter the name, the rarer it is. Short names can be used to create namespaces, like “.com” and businesses can buy a short name in order to allocate all names with the same ending. This allows the Anchor wallet to sell premium “.gm” names without users having to go through the auction process.
The way the algorithm works is that at most one premium name can be sold per day and it must be the most expensive of all premium names currently pending and it must have maintained the top spot for 24 hours. In the event of a bidding war, the rate of premium name allocation might slow down and take a week or more.
Many people don’t like this algorithm because it takes an unpredictable amount of time and is very expensive. In theory, it could take just 24 hours to get the name you want… if you are willing to pay much more than everyone else in order to jump to the front of the queue.
One benefit of this approach is that if someone attempts to front-run you then you have 24 hours to place a higher bid and secure your name.
Dynamic Pricing Algorithm
Another approach is to mimic the Bitcoin proof of work algorithm. Bitcoin aims to have one block produced every 10 minutes on average. Sometimes there may be 30 blocks in an hour and other times there may be none. If blocks are coming too frequently then Bitcoin increases the difficulty. If they are not coming fast enough then Bitcoin lowers the difficulty. The difficulty is simply the price to claim the right to produce the next block.
This same algorithm can be used to rate-limit the allocation of names without having an auction. Instead the price of names can be adjusted for every N names or every H hours. If the rate is above target then the price can increase. If the rate is below target then it can decrease.
The benefit of this algorithm is that if you want a name, you know the current price and you can grab it without delay! Furthermore, all available names are for sale at the same price at any given moment in time. Unfortunately, you can still be front-run. This approach gracefully handles short-term surges while preventing monopolization by squatters.
Hybrid Approach
You can use the dynamic pricing algorithm to establish the starting bid in an auction that ends exactly 24 hours later. You can get any name you like within 24 hours and no one can front-run anyone else.
A Political Approach
Under a political approach, you must first identify what “body of people” have the authority to grant private use of a name from the public namespace. The Eden on EOS community could be “granted” the power to arbitrate name allocation disputes. Once you have identified the community, now you must identify a process. This process could look something like:
- Anyone can request any name and propose a price to pay the community
- Votes are collected and if there are more “approve” than “reject” then the name is granted.
This process takes time, just like an auction. It can easily devolve into political parties where you must bribe the mob to get their vote. It can also easily succumb to voter apathy because most people just don’t care to pay attention. In order to be fair and sustainable, you would have to compensate everyone involved in reviewing and approving name allocations. This time and labor-intensive process could easily make names far more expensive than a pure market process.
Maybe Squatters Are not so Bad
Perhaps a community can benefit from squatters buying names so long as they keep the unused name on the market. The squatter keeps the name available and takes the risk that no buyer will ever come along. The community may not get the maximum possible price for an individual name, but it does get to sell more names at a lower price which could maximize community revenue.
Proposal for EOS Names & Symbols
A name or symbol can be “reserved” but not “consumed”. In other words, I can reserve the right to create the account “dantheman” without actually creating the account. Creating the account is expensive and once created cannot be deleated. Furthermore, transferring the account after creating it can be tricky. Token Symbol names face a similar challenge in that there are properties, such as precision, which are immutable once a symbol is fully claimed.
Transferring a “right to create” can be as simple as transferring an NFT. The fact that a “reserved” account or symbol name is more valuable than a “consumed” account or symbol name presents an interesting opportunity.
I propose we use the Hybrid Approach to reserve names; however, once a name is reserved the owner may choose to list it on the market or to convert it to an account. If they list it on the market then anyone can “buy it now” and the “squatter” keeps the profit.
With this approach you would still want to “rate-limit” name allocation, but you can error on the side of over-supplying the market and empowering name squatters to more easily make up the difference.
Political Subsidies
Many people will still complain that this process makes names or symbols too expensive for “poor” projects. Fortunately, there are many ways to petition the community for funds to cover the cost of buying the names and symbols you desire. By using market forces to establish value, the political process has a better understanding of the opportunity cost of giving a “poor” project a scarce name. There is no need to build a dedicated political process for allocating names if the political process can allocate the funds to buy the names.
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